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Modelling, dialogism and the functional cycle
Abstract. Charles Peirce, Mikhail Bakhtin and Th omas Sebeok all develop original 
research itineraries around the sign and, despite terminological diff erences, can 
be related with reference to the concept of dialogism and modelling. Jakob von 
Uexküll’s biosemiosic “functional cycle”, a model for semiosic processes, is also 
implied in the relation between dialogue and communication. 
Biological models which describe communication as a self-referential, auto-
poietic and semiotically closed system (e.g., the models proposed by Maturana, 
Varela, and Th ure von Uexküll) contrast with both the linear (Shannon and 
Weaver) and the circular (Saussure) paradigms. Th e theory of autopoietic systems 
is only incompatible with dialogism if reference is to a linear causal model which 
describes communication as developing from source to destination, or to the 
conversation model governed by the turning around together rule. Dialogism 
understood in biosemiotic terms overlaps with the concepts of interconnectivity, 
interrelation, intercorporeity and presupposes the otherness relation. 
As Uexküll says, the relation with the umwelt in nonhuman living beings is 
stable and concerns the species; on the contrary, in human beings it is, changeable 
and concerns the single individual, which is at once an advantage and a disadvan-
tage. Th anks to “syntactics”, human beings can construct, deconstruct and recon-
struct an infi nite number of worlds from a fi nite number of elements. Th is distin-
guishes human beings from other animals and determines their capacity for pos-
ing problems and asking questions. Th e human being not only produces his or her 
own world, but can also endanger it, and even destroy it to the point of causing 
the extinction of all other life forms on Earth. Th e unique capacity for refl ection on 
signs makes human beings responsible for life across the planet, both human and 
nonhuman. Such refl ections shift  semiotic research in the direction of semioethics.
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1. Conditions and aspects of communication: 
modelling, dialogism and the concept of umwelt
“Modelling”, “dialogism” and “communication” are central notions in present-day 
biosemiotic research and are closely interconnected. More precisely, “modelling” 
and “dialogism” are complementary concepts and are presupposed by “commu-
nication” generally. Th is is to say that they underlie all communicative processes, 
verbal and nonverbal, in and beyond the sphere of anthroposemiosis. To this let us 
add that biosemiotic research has evidenced that communication occurs within the 
limits of the world as modelled by a given species, and given the species-specifi c 
capacity for modelling an indefi nite number of possible worlds among human be-
ings, the most complex form of communication in the biosphere is traceable in the 
human world (Vernadsky 1926).
In a biosemiotic framework the concept of dialogism overlaps with the con-
cepts of interconnectivity, interrelation, intercorporeity, and presupposes the oth-
erness relation. Most signifi cantly, dialogism is a necessary condition for life and 
in fact can be traced in the larger biosphere beyond the strictly human. From a se-
mioethical point of view, to recognize this means to take a step forward towards 
improving the quality of life over the entire planet (Petrilli, Ponzio 2001, 2003, 
2010). And in the face of the threats presented to life in today’s global communica-
tion world, recognition of the persuasive role of dialogism is now urgent. 
As used in biosemiotics today, the concepts of “modelling”, “dialogism”, and 
“communication” largely derive their meaning from the encounter between J. von 
Uexküll (though implicit in his research) and the Tartu-Moscow School (Lotman 
1977). Th ey are also pivotal in “global semiotics” as conceived by Th omas A. 
Sebeok (2001b) who posits that life and semiosis converge. Th e project for global 
semiotics fi nds an important expression in Semiotik/Semiotics. A Handbook on the 
Sign-Th eoretic Foundations of Nature and Culture, edited by Roland Posner, Klaus 
Robering and the same Th omas Sebeok (1997–2004).
In the framework of modelling systems theory, semiosis – which involves all 
life forms – is defi ned as “the capacity of a species to produce and comprehend the 
specifi c types of models it requires for processing and codifying perceptual input 
in its own way” (Sebeok, Danesi 2000: 5), and the study of modelling behaviour in 
and across all life forms requires methodological instruments developed in the fi eld 
of biosemiotics. Reference here is specifi cally to modelling systems theory or systems 
analysis as proposed by Sebeok in his research on the interface between semiotics 
and biology. Modelling systems theory analyses semiotic phenomena in terms of 
modelling processes (Sebeok, Danesi 2000: 1–43). 
Th e applied study of modelling systems theory is called systems analysis, which, 
diff erently from the Tartu-Moscow School, distinguishes between primary, 
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secondary and tertiary modelling systems (Zaliznjak et al. 1977). On the basis of 
research in biosemiotics, the modelling capacity appears to be operative in all life 
forms and is species-specifi c.
Sebeok distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary modelling there-
by off ering a powerful instrument for a bett er understanding of the distinction be-
tween modelling and communication in a relation where modelling is foundational 
for communication. Primary modelling is the innate capacity of organisms for sim-
ulative modelling in species-specifi c ways. With reference to the species Homo it is 
also called “language”, which should not be confused with “verbal language” (as oc-
curred in the Tartu-Moscow School). “Language” understood as “verbal language” 
indicates a communication system distinct from “language” understood as a species-
specifi c modelling device. 
Secondary and tertiary modelling systems presuppose primary modelling, 
therefore they too indicate uniquely human capacities. In Sebeok’s terminology, 
the secondary modelling system is verbal language or speech, while tertiary mod-
elling systems indicate all human cultural systems, symbol-based modelling pro-
cesses grounded in language understood as modelling and in speech (Sebeok 1986, 
1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1998, 2001a). 
Charles Sanders Peirce, Mikhail Bakhtin and Th omas Sebeok each develop 
original research itineraries around the sign and, despite important diff erences in 
their work, they are easily related precisely on the basis of the concept of dialo-
gism (Petrilli 1999a, 2005, 2010a, 2012). Also, the biologist Jakob von Uexküll’s 
concept of “functional cycle” is another model for semiosic processes and it, too, 
is closely connected to the problem of dialogism and communication. Th e “func-
tional cycle” has a dialogic structure and involves inferences of the “if... then” type 
which may even occur on a primitive level, as in Pavlovian semiosis, or as prefi gura-
tions of the type of semiosis taking place during cognitive inference (with a “quasi-
mind” interpreter). However, Uexküll does not set out to use a dialogic model.
In the “functional cycle”, the interpretandum produced by the “objective con-
necting structure” becomes an interpretatum and (represented in the organism by 
a signaling disposition) is translated by the interpretant into a behavioural disposi-
tion which triggers a behaviour into the “connecting structure”. 
In his Handbook of Semiotics Winfried Nöth (1990: 176–180) analyses the im-
plications of Uexküll’s biosemiosic “functional cycle” for the concepts of dialogue 
and communication as they are commonly understood. He discusses diff erent 
communication models maintaining that biological models contrast with both lin-
ear (Shannon and Weaver) and circular (Saussure) paradigms. Biological models, 
such as those proposed by Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, and Th ure von 
Uexküll, describe communication in terms of self-referential, autopoietic and se-
miotically autonomous systems whose reactions to the environment are regulated 
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by innner needs. Maturana (1978: 54–55) maintains that dialogic exchange con-
ceived in terms of linear or circular communication processes is “pre- or anticom-
municative interaction” (see also Maturana 1980; Maturana, Varela 1980). Th e the-
ory of autopoietic systems is only incompatible with dialogism if dialogue is reduc-
tively based on linear or circular communication models. All the same, the theory 
of autopoietic systems calls for a new notion of creativity to deal with the diffi  cult 
question of how to reconcile the principle of autonomous closure and dialogue 
(conceived as the inner structure of the individual) with creativity and learning. 
From a philosophical point of view, the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl also 
introduces the idea of an interactive, that is, dialogic relation between human be-
ings and the world (Husserl 1948). As a major Italian phenomenologist Giuseppe 
Semerari (1964) observes in his monograph on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the hu-
man being does not exist separately from the world it enters and cannot be thought 
of independently from it. Th e world is the pre-condition of any experience – which 
is interactive and dialogic experience – for all living beings. 
Ludwig Landgrebe (a renowned Husserl scholar and editor of the 1948 Er-
fahrung und Urteil) rightly maintains that phenomenological thought has rectifi ed 
our conception of the world where even Kant’s critique failed. For Kant, the world 
is the idea of the totality of phenomena, therefore a construction through reason. 
Instead, according to Husserl, the world is what is implied in the experience of each 
individual being (Landgrebe 1953: 13). We can only construct a given theory or sci-
entifi c model of the world – e.g., the Newtonian or the Einsteinian model – because 
we are already, and always have been, in the world. As Landgrebe (1953: 14) says, we 
can consider the world as the set of deferrals presupposed in every living being. 
Husserl uses the expression constitutive correlation to indicate the fact that the 
world is the individual’s sphere of action. Th e individual, integrated in the unity 
of body-consciousness, is included in a given world horizon, without which nei-
ther one’s actions nor the fact of being an individual could even be imagined. As 
Husserl (Ideen, 2, X: 327) says, every reality has an environment of reality, that 
is, an “operative fi eld” which provides the sphere of conditions for its activity. 
Th erefore, each individual also belongs to its “companion’s” operative fi eld in this 
“environment”. Th e reality of living beings requires the reality of things, but the re-
ality of things also requires the reality of living beings. 
In his pivotal essay, “Umwelt and modelling”, Kalevi Kull (2010) defi nes J. 
von Uexküll’s “umwelt” as “the self-centred world of an organism” and draws his 
English translation of “models” from Th omas A. Sebeok and the Tartu-Moscow 
School’s conception of semiosic systems as modelling systems. Kull underlines the 
relation of interdependency established by Uexküll between “umwelt” and “func-
tional cycle” (Funktionskreiss). According to Uexküll, says Kull (2010: 47) “[…] 
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the functional cycles build the self-centred world of any animal. Th e functional 
cycles of the organisms are bridged (both intraorganismally and interorganismal-
ly), forming together the functional world of living beings […]. Diff erent species 
may have diff erent functional cycles, which entails the species-specifi c Umwelten or 
objective worlds.”
Kull cites Deleuze and Guatt ari1  and observes that the threshold from animal 
to human umwelt implies a deterritorialization of signs. Kull (2010: 53–54) claims:
What we will see with the appearance of language is the “creation” of time. 
Th e appearance of language becomes possible due to the appearance of signs 
that signify a relation itself. Such is, for instance, the sign “and” whose object 
is just a relation, a free relation-as-such, a relation that can be universally built 
between anything and which is independent of the items between which it is 
the relation. Th ese signs of relation can be called “syntactic signs”, and it is in 
this sense that Sebeok assigns syntax characteristic status for human language. 
Th e syntactic aspect can be distinguished in any sign system, but syntactic signs 
are a characteristic feature of language alone; they are absent in animal and 
vegetative sign systems. 
Th ese considerations can be related to research by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. With 
reference to verbal language, the Italian philosopher and semiotician criticizes the 
traditional distinction between syncategorematical signs (“and”, “of ”, with”, etc.) and 
categorematical signs (“idea”, “book”, “table”, etc.): all terms have a syntactic valency 
and their own logic concerning the operations they can be used to perform (Rossi-
Landi 1961; Ponzio 1986: 155–157).
2. Biosemiotics and “the Estonian connection”
Chapter 10 in Th e Sign and Its Masters (1979) by Th omas A. Sebeok (1921–2001) 
is entitled “Neglected fi gures in the history of semiotics: Jakob von Uexküll” 
(derived from a paper originally presented at the Th ird Wiener Symposium über 
Semiotik in August 1977). Sebeok maintains that J. von Uexküll (now commonly 
recognized as the founder of biosemiotics, see Sebeok 2010) helped provide the 
theoretical groundwork for modern ethology (Konrad Lorenz describes Uexküll as 
one of the “most important teachers”; see Lorenz 1971: 274). He also describes 
Uexküll as one of the greatest “cryptosemioticians” of the fi rst half of the 20th 
century. In fact, with the French topologist René Th om (1968: 220) and the 
1  See Deleuze, Gilles; Guatt ari, Félix 1988. A Th ousand Plateaus (London: Athlone Press) for 
a selection of their writings in English.
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Russian linguist and semiotician Jurij S. Stepanov (1971: 27–32), Sebeok (1968, 
1972: 160, 1977) was among the fi rst to acknowledge him as a “pioneer” in sign 
studies and to appreciate the originality of his contribution. 
Uexküll’s work has become widely known in the sphere of semiotic studies 
largely thanks to publications by Sebeok as well as by Uexküll’s son, Th ure von 
Uexküll (1908–2004), a scholar of endosemiotics (the study of trains of sign trans-
mission inside the organism), microsemiotics, medical semiotics and psychoso-
matic medicine. Th ure developed his father’s approach to the study of living sys-
tems and applied it to the medical sphere (T. von Uexküll 1986). Furthermore, 
since 1993, the Jakob von Uexküll Centre in Tartu, Estonia (Uexküll studied zool-
ogy at the University of Tartu from 1884 to 1889), now directed by the biosemioti-
cian Kalevi Kull, has fostered research on the legacy of J. von Uexküll (Kull 2001: 
1–59, 2010; T. von Uexküll 1981, 1989; Hoff meyer 2010; Petrilli, Ponzio 2011). 
Th e term “biosemiotic” was fi rst used by Friedrich S. Rothschild (1899–1995) 
in 1962 (Kull 1999; Petrilli 2012: 85–92). Since then both Sebeok and T. von 
Uexküll have done much to popularize the fi eld and the term, referring to the 
concept of semiotics in a Peircean framework (Sebeok et al. 1999; Sebeok et al. 
2001a). However, as in the case of iatric semiotics (symptomatology, diagnostics, 
etc.), the ultimate cradle of biosemiotics remains, even if tacitly, in ancient med-
icine, practiced and theorized by physicians like Hippocrates of Cos or Galen of 
Pergamon. 
Biosemiotics diff ers greatly from semiotic inquiry as commonly practiced 
throughout Western history with its focus on verbal and nonverbal conventional 
signs and intentional messages, and anthropocentric and logocentric bias. Uexküll 
explicitly challenged widespread anthropocentric prejudice. At the same time, 
biosemiotics incorporates “traditional” semiotics, embedding it in the far vast-
er domain of “nature semiotics”, as denominated by the Italian medical oncolo-
gist Giorgio Prodi (1928–1987; see Prodi 1977, 1982, 1983, 1988; on Prodi, see 
Sebeok in Ponzio 2002: 63). Th e study of communication in the biological sphere 
can be traced back to J. von Uexküll and his classic work, Th eoretische Biologie 
(1973[1920]). In biosemiotics, particularly as developed in a global semiotic 
framework (Sebeok 2001b, 2001c), the “semiosphere” is theorized as converging 
with the “biosphere”, eff ectively a “semiobiosphere”. 
Th e expression “semiosphere” was fi rst coined by Juri Lotman (1922–1993)  – 
by analogy with the term biosphere, introduced by Vladimir Vernadsky (1863–
1945) in 1926 – and is connected with Uexküll’s concept of umwelt (Kull, Lotman, 
M. 1995; Lotman 1984; Kull 1998). In the semiosphere sign processes oper-
ate in relation to the set of all interconnected umwelten. Umwelt is the world of 
an organism, the world centred around the self of that organism, an individually 
 Modelling, dialogism and the functional cycle 99
(species-specifi cally) modelled world. In other words, umwelt is a species-specifi c 
network of relations developed by an organism as it becomes aware of its environ-
ment. Specifi cally, the umwelt is the modelled part of the species-specifi c world, 
whereas modelling processes belong to the Innenwelt, as described by Uexküll. 
Uexküll developed a specifi c method for the experimental study of diff erent um-
welten which he termed umwelt-research ( J. von Uexküll 1909, 1940, 1946, 1973). 
 Lotman’s semiosphere only refers to the human sphere, anthroposemiosis, the 
world of culture modelled by natural language. Instead, biosemiotics uses the no-
tions of “semiosphere” and “model” as proposed by the so-called Tartu-Moscow 
School ( J. Lotman, A. Zaliznjak, V. V. Ivanov, V. Toporov, B. Uspensky, etc.), con-
ferring upon them a meaning derived from umwelt theory as formulated by J. von 
Uexküll. In this semantic enha ncement Sebeok played a pivotal role. 
Th e concept of modelling is of fundamental importance in Sebeok’s own semi-
otic research. He adapts and develops it from the Tartu-Moscow School – where 
it was introduced to denote natural language (“primary modelling system”) and 
other human cultural systems (“secondary modelling systems”) – and extends it 
beyond the domain of anthroposemiotics. In the light of the concept of umwelt 
as formulated by Uexküll, Sebeok interprets “model” as an “outside world model”, 
and maintains, on the basis of recent research in biosemiotics, that the modelling 
capacity is observable in all forms of life (Sebeok 1991a: 49–58, 68–82; Sebeok 
2001a[1994]: 117–127; Anderson, Merrell 1991; Deely 2001, 2007; Petrilli, 
Ponzio 2001, 2002, 2005; Petrilli 2010b).
In his essay “Th e Estonian connection”, originally published in the journal 
Sign Systems Studies (Sebeok 1998), and subsequently in his monograph Global 
Semiotics, the last to be published before his death in 2001, Sebeok describes the 
encounter between two great masters of the sign, ultimately between the concepts 
of “semiosphere” and “biosphere” – Juri Lotman, “a ‘Russian’ from Petrograd, who 
sett led in Estonia in the 1950s” (Sebeok 2001b: 160), and Jakob von Uexküll, “a 
Baltic ‘Prussian’ fr om Keblas, who emigrated from Estonia to Hamburg in the 
1920s” (Sebeok 2001b: 160):
“Th e Estonian Connection”, as I chose to call this article, endeavors to set in 
motion the seeds of a fascinating dialectic between Jakob von Uexküll, emi-
grant from Dorpat to the West, renowned as the scientist who had the creative 
power to imagine and delineate what we now call biosemiotics, and Yuri M. 
Lotman emigrant from Russia to Tartu, the celebrated visionary humanist 
who invented the notion of what we now call the semiosphere. Seemingly po-
lar opposites, they both formulated and brought into being vast subcontinents 
of global semiotics: von Uexküll life itself in its multiform complexity, Lotman 
the universe of the human mind in its profusion of profound discernment. At 
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bott om, of course, the biosphere and the semiosphere must be the same, for 
semiosis is the criterial att ribute of all life, inclusive of the mind observing the 
universe, which comprehends life, the biosphere. (Sebeok 2001b: 170–171) 
3. Dialogism and semiosis, more insights
Th e concept of interrelation can be developed in terms of “dialogism”, while the 
notion of dialogism, as anticipated above, can be extended beyond the sphere 
of anthroposemiosis and applied to all communication processes. In turn, 
“communication” is not only grounded in the concept of modelling, but also 
in dialogism. And given that the concept of dialogue is fundamental in Charles 
Peirce’s thought system, to proceed in this direction also opens to developments 
in biosemiotics in terms of Peircean semiotics. In fact, the relation between sign 
and interpretant, as understood by Peirce, is a dialogic relation. Peircean semiotics 
eff ectively evidences the dialogic nature of the sign and semiosis. Th erefore, dialogism 
is not a prerogative of discourse. Not only verbal signs, but any situation or semiosis 
is a relational process at diff erent degrees of dialogism (Petrilli, Ponzio 2008; 
Ponzio 1999, 2007a, 2007b).
Th e interpretant of a sign is another sign, which the previous sign creates in the 
interpreter. Th e interpretant sign is “an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more devel-
oped sign” (CP 2.228). Th erefore the interpretant sign cannot be identical to the in-
terpreted sign, it cannot be a repetition, nor is it a mere mechanical eff ect, precisely 
because it is mediated, interpretive and as such it is always new. As to the previous 
sign, the interpretant is a response to it and as such it inaugurates a new sign pro-
cess, a new semiosis. In this sense it is a “more developed sign”. As a sign the inter-
pretant produces another sign that acts, in turn, as another interpretant: therefore, 
the interpretant opens to a new semiosis, it develops the sign process, it is a new 
sign occurrence. 
Each time there is a sign occurrence, including the “First Sign”, there is a 
“Th ird”, something mediated, a response, an interpretive novelty, an interpretant. 
Consequently, a sign is an interpretant by constitution. Th e fact that the interpre-
tant (Th ird) is in turn a sign (First), and that the sign (First) is in turn an interpre-
tant (already a Th ird) places the sign in an open network of interpretants: this is 
the Peircean principle of infi nite semiosis or of the endless series of interpretants 
(CP 1.339).
Th erefore, the meaning of a sign is a response by another sign, the interpretant, 
that calls for another response, another interpretant. Th is implies the dialogic nature 
of sign and semiosis. A sign has its meaning in another sign that responds to it and 
is, in turn, a sign if there is another sign to interpret it and to respond to it, and 
 Modelling, dialogism and the functional cycle 101
so forth; it is a process ad infi nitum. In other words, something urges a response 
and becomes a sign, that is, something has meaning, if there is another something 
which interprets it and therefore plays the part of response, that is, of interpretant; 
this interpretant, in turn, means something and becomes a sign, if interpreted as 
something which calls for another response, another interpretant. 
Th erefore, a sign is a dialogue between an interpreted and interpretant, and se-
miosis is an open dialogue among various interpreted and interpretant signs. In our 
terminology, the fundamental terms that constitute a sign include the interpreted, 
and the interpretant, in a relationship where the interpretant makes the interpreted 
possible (Ponzio 1990). For a sign to subsist there must be an interpreted sign and 
an interpretant sign, in other words, an object that acts as the interpreted of an in-
terpretant (see Petrilli 2001[1998]: Ch. 1; Ponzio 2006). And it is important to 
underline that when we speak of the “interpreted-interpretant” relation, our refer-
ence is to a (minimal and abstract) triadic relation. Th e interpreted implies the ob-
ject of interpretation, so this expression must always be understood as a relation 
among “object-interpreted-interpretant”.
Th e interpreted becomes a sign component because it receives an interpretation, 
but in turn, the interpretant is also a sign component with the potential to engen-
der a new sign: therefore, where there is a sign, there are immediately two, and giv-
en that the interpretant can engender a new sign, there are immediately three, and 
so forth, as described by the Peircean concept of “infi nite semiosis” or unending 
chain of deferrals from one interpretant to another. 
In our opinion – and in accordance with Peirce who reformulated the classic 
notion of substitution in the medieval expression aliquid stat pro aliquo in terms of 
interpretation – the sign is fi rstly an interpretant (see Petrilli 2001[1998]: I.1). 
To analyse the sign starting from the object of interpretation – the interpreted – 
means to start from a secondary level. In other words, to start from the object-in-
terpreted means to start from a point in the chain of deferrals, or semiosic chain, 
which cannot be considered as the point of departure. Nor can the interpreted be 
privileged by way of abstraction at a theoretical level to explain the workings of 
sign processes. 
For example, a spot on the skin is a sign insofar as it may be interpreted as a 
symptom of sickness of the liver: this is already a secondary level in the interpretive 
process. At a primary level, retrospectively, the skin disorder is an interpretation 
enacted by the organism itself in relation to an anomaly which is disturbing it and 
to which it responds. Th e skin disorder is already in itself an interpretant response.
To say that the sign is fi rstly an interpretant means to say that the sign is fi rstly 
a response. We could also say that the sign is a reaction: but only on the condition 
that by “reaction” we mean “interpretation” (similarly to Charles Morris’s behav-
iourism, but diff erently from the mechanistic approach). 
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Th ere are two main types of interpretant: interpretant of identifi cation, which is 
connected to the signal, code and sign system; this kind of interpretant allows for 
recognition of the sign, that is, identifi cation of something; interpretant of responsive 
understanding (or answering comprehension) which, instead, is the specifi c interpre-
tant of the sign, that is, that which interprets the specifi c sense or meaning of a sign. 
Th is second type of interpretant does not limit itself to identifying the inter-
preted, but rather expresses its properly pragmatic meaning, by installing with the 
interpreted a relationship of involvement and participation; in fact it responds to 
the interpreted and takes a stand towards it. 
Th erefore the original modality of being a sign is otherness and dialogue. By 
contrast with univocality, reiteration, identity which characterize signals, dialogue 
and otherness are the original, constitutive modality of that which emerges as a 
sign in the proper sense. In other words, the sign subsists and is characterized as 
a sign insofar as it is a response and in relation to that which is other from itself. In 
fact, the sign is diff erentiated both from the object acting as a referent and from an-
other sign acting as interpretant, without which it could not be a sign. 
Developing the important semiotic implication of his father’s work in biology, 
Th ure von Uexküll describes the body as a living semiosic system engaged in dia-
logue with its environment and internally with itself (see Staiano-Ross 2010: 348). 
He identifi es three diff erent types of semiosis which he characterizes in terms of 
the diff erent roles carried out by emitt er and receiver (T. von Uexküll 1997: 447–
456, 1992b: 455–470): (1) semiosis of information or signifi cation; (2) semiosis 
of symptomatization; and (3) semiosis of communication. 
Dialogue and semiosis coincide not only in the sense that dialogue is semiosis 
but also in the sense that semiosis is dialogue. Dialogue does not only subsist in se-
miosis of information or signifi cation where an interpreted (inanimate environment, 
object, act, or process, that is, a ‘quasi-emitt er’) becomes a sign only because it re-
ceives an interpretation by the interpretant which is a response to the former.
Dialogue also subsists in semiosis of communication. In this case, the interpreted 
sign is already an interpretant response in itself, therefore an interpretation. It is ad-
dressed to somebody before it is interpreted as a sign by the subsequent interpre-
tant. As an interpreted sign it calls for interpretation both in terms of mere recogni-
tion or identifi cation, and of answering comprehension.
Semiosis of symptomatization also involves dialogue. Here too the interpreted is 
an interpretant response (symptom) which, however, as in semiosis of information or 
signifi cation does not originally arise for the sake of being interpreted as a sign. 
Th erefore, dialogue does not originate with signalling behaviour from a send-
er intending to communicate something about an object, which responds to the 
linear communication model. Rather, the semiosic process taken in its entirety is 
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dialogic. Th e interpretant as such is “a disposition to respond”. Th is expression is 
used by Martin Krampen (1997: 259) to describe the dialogic interaction between 
a sender and a receiver. 
As anticipated at the beginning of this paper, a dialogic relation can be estab-
lished in the “functional cycle” between an interpreted (interpretandum) and an 
interpretant (interpreted by another interpretant, and so forth). Th e interpretant 
does not limit itself to identifying the interpreted, but rather establishes an inter-
active relationship with it. Moreover, not only is the structure of the “functional 
cycle” dialogic, but dialogue in communication (understood in a strict sense) can 
also be analysed in the light of the “functional cycle”. In other words, the dialogic 
communicative relationship between a sender who intends to communicate some-
thing about an object and a receiver can, in turn, be considered on the basis of the 
“functional cycle” model. 
4. Bakhtinian architectonics and umwelt
In Bakhtin’s interpretation “dialogue” cannot be reduced to the communication 
of messages, nor does it depend on initiative taken by self (Bakhtin 1963; Petrilli, 
Ponzio 2005: 144–150; Ponzio 2003). Th e self is always in dialogue with the world 
and with others, whether it knows this or not (Petrilli 2013). Identity is dialogic. 
Dialogism is at the very heart of the self. Th e self, “the semiotic self ” (Sebeok et 
al. 2001), is dialogic in the sense that it is involved with the world and with others 
according to species-specifi c modalities. Self is implied dialogically in otherness, 
just as the “grotesque body” (Bakhtin 1968) is implied in the body of other living 
beings. From a Bakhtinian perspective dialogue and intercorporeity are closely 
interconnected: dialogue is not possible among disembodied minds, and is only 
adequately understood in light of the biosemiotic conception of sign. 
It is worth pointing out in passing that some of Bakhtin’s main interpreters have 
fundamentally misunderstood his concept of dialogue (Ponzio 2008). Th is is con-
fi rmed by interpretations of Bakhtinian dialogue in terms theorized by such au-
thors as Plato (1961), Buber (1947), Mukařovsky (1977).
Instead, for Bakhtin (1968), dialogue is embodied, intercorporeal expression, 
and as such it is associated with the “grotesque body”. Th is metaphor portrays the 
idea of the vital and indissoluble interconnectedness of one’s own body (which 
is never a separate and autonomous body, if not seen as a delusory mystifi cation) 
with the world and with the bodies of others. 
Th e shift  in focus from identity (whether individual, as in the case of conscious-
ness or the self, or collective, that is, a community, historical language, or a cultural 
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system at large) to alterity represents a sort of Copernican revolution involving all 
living beings and not just the human. Also Bakhtin conducted research in the fi eld 
of biology and, in fact, developed his conception of dialogism keeping account of 
recent developments in life sciences. He was particularly interested in Vladimir 
Vernadsky and his conception of the biosphere. As Bakhtin (1986: 137) says:
When consciousness appeared in the world (in existence) and, perhaps, when 
biological life appeared (perhaps not only animals, but trees and grass also 
witness and judge), the world (existence) changed radically. A stone is still 
stony and the sun still sunny, but the event of existence as a whole (unfi nalized) 
becomes completely diff erent because a new and major character in this event 
appears for the fi rst time on the scene of earthly existence – the witness and the 
judge. And the sun, while remaining physically the same, has changed because 
it has begun to be cognized by the witness and the judge. It has stopped simply 
being and has started being in itself and for itself […], as well as for the other, 
because it has been refl ected in the consciousness of the other. 
Dialogism according to Bakhtin means that in biosemiosic terms the living be-
ing cannot be cut off  from the environment, it cannot be indiff erent to its sur-
roundings, but rather it constitutes a system with the latt er. Using a Kantian term, 
Bakhtin calls this s ystem architectonics. Both Bakhtin and J. von Uexküll were in-
fl uenced by Kant, but not passively. In line with the spirit of Kantian critique, their 
att itude was critical. 
Uexküll and Bakhtin both criticized mechanist behaviourism and reduction 
of self (whether human or nonhuman) to the status of an object, or machine. As 
Uexküll (1992[1967/1934]: 320) remarks, descriptions by mechanistic theorists 
are made 
in terms of rigid mechanics or more plastic dynamics. Th ey brand animals as 
mere objects. Th e proponents of such theories forget that, from the fi rst, they 
have overlooked the most important thing, the subject which uses the tools, 
perceives and functions with their aid. Th e mechanist have pieced together 
the sensory and motor organs of animals, like so many parts of a machine, 
ignoring their real functions of perceiving and acting, and have even gone 
on to mechanize man himself. According to the behaviourists, man’s own 
sensations and will are mere appearance, to be considered, if at all, only as 
disturbing static. 
Instead, if we focus “on the operator” rather than on mechanical structures, men 
and animals can be regarded “as subjects whose essential activity consists of per-
ceiving and acting” (Uexküll 1992[1967/1934]: 320). Th is is Bakhtin’s aim as well, 
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which explains his interest in literary writing and specifi cally in Dostoevsky’s “poly-
phonic novel”. Literary writing does not reduce what it describes to the status of 
object; rather, it allows the subject to be a subject “whose essential activity”, in the 
words of Uexküll just cited above, “consists of perceiving and acting”.
Bakhtin’s architectonics with its space, time, and values very closely resembles 
Uexküll’s um welt. Like Bakhtinian architectonics, the Uexküllian umwelt is the 
world centred around the self of an organism – the world in which an organism 
lives, which it recognizes and constructs (Kull 2010: 43). Th e expression “architec-
tonics” refers to a unit formed by all that a subject perceives, the perceptual world 
(Merkwelt), and by what it does, the eff ector world (Wirkwelt), in J. von Uexküll’s 
words, the Umwelt (Uexküll 1992[1967/1934]: 20).
In Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin formulates the following expressions: 
“the concrete architectonics of an actually experienced world”; every world “is ar-
ranged around a sole centre, that constitutes the starting point of the once-occur-
rent participation in being”; it is “the world in which a performed act orients itself 
on the basis of its once-occurrent participation in being”; this world is the “uni-
tary and unique world that is experienced concretely”, and “it is given in individual 
emotional-volitional tones” (Bakthin 1993[1920–1924]: 53–54, 56–58):
But these concretely individual and never-repeatable worlds of actual act-
performing consciousness (of which, qua real components, unitary and 
once-occurrent being-as-event comes to be composed) include common 
moments – not in the sense of universal concepts or laws, but in the sense of 
common moment or constituents in their various concrete architectonics. It 
is this concrete architectonics of the actual world of the performed act [that 
has to be described], that is, not the abstract scheme but the concrete plan 
or design of the world of a unitary and once-occurrent act or deed, the basic 
concrete moment of its construction and their mutual disposition. Th ese 
basic moments are I-for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the-other. […] 
All spatial-temporal values and all sense-content values are drawn toward and 
concentrated around these central emotional-volitional moments: I, the other, 
I-for-the-other [and the other-for-me]. (Bakthin 1993[1920–1924]: 53–54; 
translation revised by the authors of this essay)
A semiotic task carried out by von Uexküll, and inspired by Kant is his description 
of the forms of space and time in biological terms as part of the umwelt. He casts 
them in a semiotic frame, showing their diff erent functions in diff erent worlds. 
Without a living subject there is neither space nor time. “With this”, as Uexküll 
(1992[1967/1934]: 326) says, “biology has ultimately established its connec-
tion with the doctrine of Kant, which it intends to exploit in the Umwelt theory by 
stressing the decisive role of the subject”. 
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Bakhtin is the real author of the essay “Contemporary vitalism”, published in a 
scientifi c journal of biology in 1926 under the name of his friend, the biologist Ivan 
I. Kanaev (Kanaev 1926). Kanaev subsequently revealed the true origin of the text 
which, authored as it was by no more than an amateur in the fi eld, could never have 
been published in a specialized journal (Deprett o 1997). 
Th is article is an important tessera for the reconstruction of Bakhtin’s thought 
system from the time of his early studies. In it Bakhtin discusses problems of the 
biological and philosophical orders together. Like the biologist J. von Uexküll 
who m he mentions in this text, Bakhtin evidences a close relation between biology 
and the study of signs at a very early stage in his studies. What varies is the start-
ing point: in Uexküll’s case, an interest in biology; in Bakhtin’s case, a focus on the 
study of signs (on the relation between life sciences and sign sciences, see Petrilli 
1999b, 1999c, 2008; Petrilli, Ponzio, 2001, 2002). 
Kanaev contributed to Bakhtin’s interest in biology and introduced him to the 
physiologist Aleksej Ukhtomsky from whom he derives his concept of the “chrono-
tope”, which he then applies to the novel. 
Bakhtin criticizes vitalism, the conception of a special extramaterial force in liv-
ing beings that underlies all life processes. In particular, he criticizes the biologist 
Hans Driesch who interpreted homeostasis in the organism in terms of total au-
tonomy from its surrounding environment (Driesch 1915). In his own description 
of the interaction between organism and environment, Bakhtin, on the contrary, 
opposes the dualism of life force and physical-chemical processes and maintains 
that the organism forms a monistic unit with the surrounding world (Ponzio 2002; 
Petrilli, Ponzio 2000b). As we have somehow anticipated, the relation of body to 
world is dialogic in the sense that the body responds to its environment modelling 
its world.
In his preface to J. von Uexküll, Stroll through the Worlds of Animal and Men, 
Th ure von Uexküll observes: 
Th is book appeared more than half a century ago, at a time when scientists 
were convinced that “science” had to be physics and chemistry. In this frame, 
Jakob von Uexküll’s work was considered “vitalism”, which meant unscientifi c 
and metaphysical. […] For the positivistic understanding of Science in his 
time, speaking of Planmässigkeit in nature means inhibiting research. In von 
Uexküll’s view, however, research had to begin with the proposition that 
Planmässigkeit could be an aspect of nature, for the presupposition that nature 
is meaningless and senseless is itself a metaphysical presupposition. (T. von 
Uexkull 1992a: 277)
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5. The primary modelling device or 
language, and human responsibility
As anticipated, the relation with the umwelt in nonhuman living beings is gen-
erally stable and concerns the species; in human beings it is, on the contrary, 
changeable and concerns the single individual (see the fi nal part of Uexküll 1992 
[1967/1934]). Th e diff erence can be explained in terms of the human species-spe-
cifi c primary modelling device or “language” (Sebeok). As a biological organism, 
the human being fl ourishes in the great biosemiosic network interconnectedly with 
other biological organisms populating the biosphere. 
All living beings are endowed with a capacity for modelling, communication and 
dialogism with the diff erence that the “primary modelling device”, or “language”, is 
exclusive to human beings. Sebeok was ironical about projects developed to teach 
verbal language to captive primates. Such projects were based on the false assump-
tion that animals might be able to talk, or, even more scandalously, that they are 
endowed with a capacity for language understood as a modelling device. Th e dis-
tinction established by Sebeok between language and speech is not only a response 
to false conclusions regarding animal communication, but is also a general critique 
of phonocentrism, of the general tendency to base scientifi c investigation on an-
thropocentric principles. 
Sebeok described language as a human primary modelling device. Every species 
is endowed with a model that “produces” its own world. “Language” is the name 
he chose for the human model. However, this human primary modelling device, 
or language, is completely diff erent from modelling devices in other life forms. Its 
distinctive feature is what the linguists call syntax – though in this context the term 
“syntactics” is preferable –, that is, the capacity to order single elements on the ba-
sis of operational rules (Morris 1938). 
Yet, while for linguists these elements are the words, phrases, and sentences, 
etc. of historical-natural languages, Sebeok referred to a mute syntax. Th anks to 
syntax, or, rather, syntactics, human language (understood as a modelling device 
and not as a historical-natural language) is similar to Lego building blocks. It can 
re assemble a limited number of construction pieces in an infi nite number of dif-
ferent ways. As a modelling device, language can produce an indefi nite number 
of models. In other words, the same pieces can be taken apart and put together to 
construct an infi nite number of diff erent worlds.
Th erefore, thanks to language as modelling, human animals, similarly to other 
species, not only can produce worlds, but they can also produce and organize an 
infi nite number of possible worlds, an undetermined number of worlds (Deely 
2002; Petrilli 2009). Th is leads back to the question of the “play of musement” 
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(Sebeok 1981), a human capacity that Sebeok, following Peirce, considered as 
fundamental. Human evolution itself from the hominid to Homo habilis, and subse-
quently to Homo erectus through to Homo sapiens and Homo sapiens sapiens, can be 
explained on the basis of this modelling device called language (present in homi-
nids from their origins). Th e human being is able to construct, deconstruct and re-
construct an infi nite number of worlds and worldviews on the basis of a fi nite num-
ber of elements. Th is capacity distinguishes human beings from other animals. 
Sebeok att ributes this creative capacity for constructing new worlds, for the 
“play of musement”, to the fact that the human being is a syntactical animal, which 
is to say that the human being is endowed with a capacity for ars combinatoria. 
Humans beings are not only capable of using signs, but also of refl ecting on signs, 
of talking about signs, and of planning. In other words, the human being is not only 
capable of semiosis like all other animals, but also of metasemiosis which ensues 
from language understood as modelling. Consequently, on the basis of this species-
specifi c characteristic the human animal can be defi ned as a metasemiosic animal or 
as a semiotic animal (Deely et al., 1995). 
Like language (i.e. primary modelling), speech, too, made its appearance as an 
adaptation, but for the sake of communication, and much later in evolutionary de-
velopment than language, precisely with Homo sapiens. Speech organizes and ex-
ternalizes language. Subsequently, through processes of exaptation, speech became 
a (secondary) modelling process, thereby enhancing nonverbal capacities already 
possessed by human beings (Gould, Vrba 1982: 4–15). 
Th erefore, if we ask the question whether the human capacity for refl ection, 
that is, metasemiosis, is a question of adaptation, the answer is no even in the case 
of human species-specifi c secondary modelling, that is, modelling by verbal lan-
guage (Merrell 2001: 229–262). In other words, not even rationality, a capacity 
considered specifi c to human beings, is described to satisfaction solely in terms of 
adaptation. Exaptation, that is, a shift  in original function, or readaptation, is the 
preferable explanation (Gould, Vrba 1982: 4–15). In fact, the original function of 
verbal language (without which rationality cannot be conceived) is communica-
tion. Only subsequently (and this marks the passage from Homo sapiens to Homo 
sapiens sapiens) did verbal language come to be used for a diff erent function, that 
is, to contribute and empower the human capacity for modelling (see Fano 1972). 
Consequently, via a process of exaptation another form of modelling, that is, the 
secondary modelling of languages, which is multiple and varied as well, is added to 
the human being’s original modelling (primary modelling).
In spite of insistence on the “creative character of (verbal) language”, Chomsky’s 
linguistics is unable to explain the plurality of natural languages (nor “inner plu-
rilingualism” in any single natural language) (Chomsky 1976, 1986, 1988). Th e 
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reason is that Chomsky’s linguistics presupposes an innate Universal Grammar. 
However, the fact that human beings should have invented numerous natural lan-
guages is the direct result of the primary modelling capacity, therefore of the ca-
pacity to invent multiple worlds. In other words, the plurality of natural languages 
derives from the propensity of language for the “play of musement” or, in tune with 
Giambatt ista Vico, for “poetic logic”, characteristic of human beings.
In the case of nonhuman animals (unlike human animals), the relation between 
modelling and umwelt is univocal, unidirectional ( J. von Uexküll 1909, 1992; 
Hoff meyer 1996). We know that nonhuman animals are born into a world which 
they are not programmed to modify, if not according to an original Bauplan as es-
tablished by the genetic patrimony of the species they belong to. Th anks to syntac-
tics, human beings, on the contrary, are endowed in such a way as to be able to in-
terrogate their own umwelt, as much as that of others.
Th e semiotic or metasemiosic capacity entails a capacity for the suspension of 
action and for deliberation, therefore, for conscious awareness and critical think-
ing. Th e immediate implication is that by contrast with other animals the human 
being is invested biosemiosically and phylogenetically with a unique capacity for 
responsibility, for making choices and taking standpoints, for creative intervention 
upon the course of semiosis throughout the whole biosphere. In this sense the “se-
miotic animal” is also a “semioethic animal” (Petrilli, Ponzio 2003, 2010; Petrilli 
2010a). 
Th ough the capacity to produce and organize many worlds, an undetermined 
number of worlds, is a characteristic of the species, the initiative for invention and 
change is ultimately individual. Th at initiative should be individual is both a re-
source and a problem, for while this facilitates transformation, innovation and con-
struction of multiple and diff erent umwelten, it is also the cause of uncertainty, in-
security and confl ict (Sebeok 1981). Th e human being not only produces its own 
world, but is also capable of endangering it and even of destroying it to the point of 
causing the extinction of all other life forms on Earth. Moreover, the capacity for 
refl ection on signs, unique to the species, makes human beings the only respon-
sible living being we know of, not only for their own life, but for all life across the 
whole planet. Such issues shift  semiotic refl ection in the direction of what we have 
proposed to denominate semioethics.
As part of a sign network characterized by continuity in deferral from one sign 
to the next, typical of semiosic fl uxes, and taking into account Sebeok’s axiom that 
semiosis and life converge, human beings are invested biologically with a capacity 
for responsibility. Responsibility understood as responsibility/responsivity entails 
the capacity to care for semiosis globally, which is to say to care for life in its inter-
active and dialogical multiplicity across the entire planet. 
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Моделирование, диалогизм и функциональный цикл: 
биосемиотические и философские озарения
Чарльз Пирс, Михаил Бахтин и Томас Себеок  развивали оригинальные концепции зна-
ка, которые,  несмотря на терминологические различия, можно рассматривать как соотне-
сенные с понятиями диалогизма и моделирования.  «Функциональный цикл» Якоба фон 
Юкскюля –  модель для семиотических процессов – также включается в отношение между 
диалогом и коммуникацией. 
Биологические модели, которые описывают коммуникацию как автореферентную, 
«автопойэтическую» и семиотически закрытую систему (например, модель, предложен-
ная Матураной и Варелой или же  Туре фон Юкскюлем), контрастируют как с линейной 
(Шеннон и Уивер), так и с циклической  (Соссюр) парадигмой.  Теория «автопойэтиче-
ских» (autopoietic) систем только в том случае  несовместима с диалогизмом, если отсыла-
ет к линейной каузальной  модели, которая описывает коммуникацию как развивающуюся 
от источника до пункта назначения, или к модели беседы, управляемой вращением вокруг 
правила. Диалогизм, понимаемый в биосемиотических терминах, связан с понятиями вза-
имосвязи, взаимоотношения,  «интертелесности»  (intercorporeity)  и предполагает инако-
вость отношения. 
Как говорит Юкскюль, отношение с  умвельтом у не-человеческих живых существ 
устойчиво и касается разновидностей; у людей это, напротив, изменчиво и касается кон-
кретного человека, что является одновременно преимуществом и неудобством. Благодаря 
«синтактике» люди могут построить, вскрыть противоречия и восстановить бесконеч-
ное число миров от конечного ряда элементов. Это отличает людей от других животных 
и определяет их способность задавать вопросы. Человек не только производит его или ее 
собственный мир, но и может также подвергнуть опасности  и даже разрушить его,  послу-
жив причиной исчезновения всех других форм жизни на Земле. Уникальная способность 
к размышлению о знаках делает людей ответственными за жизнь на планете, как человече-
ской так  и не-человеческой. Такие размышления перемещают семиотическое исследова-
ние в направлении семиоэтики.
Modelleerimine, dialoogilisus ja funktsiooniring: 
biosemiootilisi ja fi losoofi lisi vaateid
Nii Charles Sanders Peirce, Mihhail Bahtin kui ka Th omas Sebeok kujundasid välja oma algu-
pärase teadusliku lähenemise märgile ning terminoloogilistele erinevustele vaatamata on neid 
võimalik seostada, viidates dialoogilisuse ja modelleerimise mõistetele. Dialoogi ja kommuni-
katsiooni vahelises suhtes on implitseeritud ka Jakob von Uexkülli “funktsiooniring”, semioosi-
liste protsesside mudel.
Bioloogilised mudelid, mis kirjeldavad kommunikatsiooni eneseleviitava, autopoieetilise 
ning semiootiliselt suletud süsteemina (nt mudel, mille pakuvad välja Maturana ja Varela, nagu 
ka Th ure von Uexküll), vastanduvad nii lineaarse (Shannon ja Weaver) kui ka tsüklilise (Saussu-
re) paradigmaga. Autopoieetiliste süsteemide teooria on dialoogilisusega sobimatu üksnes siis, 
kui osutatakse lineaarsele kausaalsele mudelile, mis kirjeldab kommunikatsiooni allikast siht-
punktini arenevana, või vestlusmudelile, mida valitseb kooskeeramise reegel. Biosemiootilistes 
terminites mõistetud dialoogilisus katt ub interkonnektiivsuse, interrelatsioonilisuse, interkor-
poraalsuse mõistetega ning selle eelduseks on teisesussuhe.
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Nagu ütleb Uexküll, on mitt einimestest elusolendite suhe omailmaga stabiilne ning puu-
dutab liiki; inimestel on see, vastuoksa, muutlik ning puudutab üksikindiviidi, mis on ühtaegu 
nii eelis kui ka puudus. Tänu “süntaktikale” suudavad inimesed konstrueerida, dekonstrueeri-
da ning rekonstrueerida lõplikust arvust elementidest lõpmatu arvu maailmu. See eristabki 
inimest teistest loomadest ning tingib nende võime esitada küsimusi. Inimene mitt e üksnes ei 
loo omaenda maailma, vaid võib seda ka ohustada ja isegi hävitada, kuni selleni välja, et võib 
põhjustada kõikide teiste eluvormide väljasuremise Maal. Ainulaadne võime märkide üle refl ek-
teerida muudab inimesed vastutavaks nii inimliku kui ka mitt einimliku elu eest kogu planeedil. 
Sellised mõtt ekäigud suunavad semiootilist uurimistegevust semioeetika poole.  
